book of Ivo Maas, it is striking that four have been trained in the National School of Administration, Pascal Lamy, (b, 1947) , ENA 1975, Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), -13, Michel Camdessus, (b. 1933 , ENA 1960, Chairman of the Monetary Committee of the EEC from Dec. 1982 to Dec. 1984 , chairman IMF 1987 -2000 , Jacques de Larosière, (b.1929 , ENA 1958 , Chairman IMF (1978 -1987 , Banque de France, Henri Chavranski, (b.1930) Paradoxically the most of these people had a background leaning towards a significant role of the State in the nation economy whereas Maurice Allais (1911 Allais ( -2010 , the major figure of the French liberalism during the second half of the 20th century was a tireless opponent to "laissez-fairism" and liberal globalization. Finally, we will study the specific but convergent positions of four major French political figures, coming from the socialist current but in favor of economic liberalization: Delors, Chavranski, Lamy and Macron. (section 3).
SECTION 1 : FRENCH ECONOMISTS AND THE IMFS FROM 1943 TO 1982
The French vision of international monetary issues has sharply differentiated since the 1930s from the Anglo-Saxon conception, but it never succeeded in imposing itself It was midway between the Gold standard system and the Gold exchange standard, the foreing currency assets being liable to be exchanged only above a certain level, below which the debtor countries should only provide guarantees (M. Lelart, 1994, p. 522) . This took the form of bilateral monetary agreements (with a long-term ambition of multilateral agreements) based on fixed exchange rates, allowing with certain limitations to use the partners' reserves without gold or foreign currency exchanges.
But this plan was not officially proposed at Bretton Woods by the French delegation. In 1944, France was no more able to directly influence international monetary relations and also failed in imposing a discount on interest rates for countries that had been invaded (E. Monnet, 2017, p countries in surplus and countries in deficit, to achieve an equilibrium of national trade balances which would not be automatic but required by the refund and loan mechanisms (the surplus countries, to be reimbursed for their loans in bancor, needing to import products from deficit countries).
This plan of international financial cooperation, which would have notably required large transfers from the United States to Great Britain, was not the liking of the US government. Their large gold reserves after WWII allowed the United States to place the dollar at the centre of the international monetary system, as its gold convertibility could easily be secured. The plan developed by Harry White as soon as 1942 was de facto the only one being presented at Bretton Woods.
Though his plan was excluded, Keynes' influence was great in the setting up of BW's institutions, as they aimed to promote a stable international monetary order and international cooperation rather than trade and monetary wars. But during the following decade, the system of BW evolved from a a system of equal currencies (the dollar but also the pound sterling being key currencies) into a gold-dollar system, the American currency progressively gaining supremacy as an international reserve currency.
In 1949, Jean de Largentaye, member of the French delegation at BW and French translator of Keynes's General Theory in 1942 , considered that the good intentions of monetary cooperation at the origin of the negotiations for the creation of the IMF were limited by the Anglo-American supremacy (cf E. Monnet, 2017) .
Four years after BW, France is excluded from the IMF mechanism, as a sanction against its 1948's devaluation (the franc was devalued 4 times between 1948 and 1949) and its cross exchange rates policy judged as violating the official dollar/sterling parity and as liable to encourage the sterling devaluation, which will be effective in Following him, Jacques Rueff advocates for the revaluation of gold and denounces the gold exchange standard, "monetary sin of the West". He is convinced of the need for a return to the balances of payments equilibrium to avoid the resurgence of trade protectionism. In fact, fixed exchange rates prevented automatic balance of payments adjustments in the event of persistent structural imbalances and forced deficit countries like France to adopt austerity policies, to contain inflation. And the devaluation had a significant political cost, considered as a national failure on the international scene.
Supporting a policy of budgetary austerity and a gradual return to the gold standard, Rueff is concerned about the considerable deficits in the US balance of payments allowed by the new international role of the dollar as a reserve currency.
Through the metaphor of the tailor, he explains that the country with the key currency never suffers from the deficit of its balance of payments. He advocates the US buy-back, with the gold they held, of all dollar assets held by central banks. To that end, an increase in the price of gold is advocated. These arguments will serve France to push the United States to reform the international monetary system (Bordo, Simard, White 1993 The French demands for a greater role for gold in the international monetary system were aimed at increasing the influence of Europe, which now had a large share of the world's stock. But France's demands did not lead to any significant decision to reform the system, nor did they permit the Common Market to obtain a right of veto in the IMF (1967 negotiations (Bordo et alii, op. cit.) .
After the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the role of the IMF decreased considerably, as it was no longer necessary to support payment balances using credit from the institution.
In 1998, the French economist Maurice Allais renewed with the old debate by advocating a "new Bretton Woods" for a reform of the international monetary system, arguing in particular for the complete abandonment of the dollar as currency of account, exchange and reserve at the international level, for the fusion between the IMF and the WTO and for the progressive establishment of an international unit 1 "Europe will happen through the currency or will not happen".
of account through a system of indexation in real values of the securities (Allais, 1999) . « France has a fundamental interest in a world of extremely active trade, rapidly developing imports and exports, in a world, therefore, where commercial transactions will be as free, with as little embarrassment as possible, where obstacles of every kind , Customs duties, quotas, will be as low as they can be. » (Marjolin, 1946, p. 274) .
SECTION 2 FRENCH VIEWS ALONG THE ROAD TO EMU
He attacked consistently the protectionism asserting that « We must not fight against autarky by saying: it is harmful; But we must say: it is impossible. » (ibid. p. 275) . Meanwhile he was confident that « In the space of ten years, economic technology has made considerable progress. Henceforth, the intervention of the State in economic life is no longer a matter of empiricism and trial and error. The war showed what a state could get when it was decided to intervene and that it had a public opinion behind it that supported it. There is no economic objective that can not be achieved, and the maintenance of full employment appears perfectly feasible » (ibidem, p.275). But it is doubtful if this paean for economic interventionism is anything more than a last ressort defence of market economy.
In 1948 As Mendès-France (1907 -1982 was to become an iconic reference for Jacques Delors, we must devote some attention to his economic positions. Mendès-France devoted his thesis to the monetary policies of the Poincaré government The fact that many countries accept as a principle, dollars being as good as gold for the payment of the difference existing to their advantage in the American balance of trade, this very fact, leads Americans to get into debt, and to get into debt for free, at the expense of other countries. Because, what the US owes them, it is paid, at least in part, with dollars they are the only allowed to emit. Considering the serious consequences a crisis would have in such a domain, we think that measures must be taken on time to avoid it. We consider necessary that international trade be established as it was the case before the great tragedies of the world, on an indisputable monetary base and one that does not bear the mark of any particular country. Which base? Truly it's hard to imagine how it can be any standard criterion other than GOLD! Yes, gold whose nature does not alter, which may be formed equally into ingots, bars or coins, which has no nationality and which has, eternally and universally, been regarded as the unalterable currency par excellence.
The supreme law, the golden rule -and indeed it's pertinent to say it -that must be enforced and honored again in international economic relations, is the duty to balance, from one monetary area to another, by effective inflows and outflows of gold, the balance of payments resulting from their exchanges. (De Gaulle, 1965) President de Gaulle's political posturing was a weapon to further a French gold policy that was an extension of earlier policies dating back to the interwar period. The The free movement of capital has followed a unique and 'non-linear' evolutionary trajectory. In contrast to the Treaty provisions on goods, persons, and services, where liberalization was driven by the Court, a step ahead of the Union's political branches and often against the natural instincts of national governments, the development of the Treaty rules on capital movements was for many years essentially left to the Member States as a matter of policy. The Court's decision to secede control over the pace and depth of capital market liberalization to the Member States was taken in Casati. In that decision, the CJ famously concluded that Article 67(1) EEC-the central provision on intra-EU capital movements in the founding EEC Treaty-was not directly effective. According to the Court, the wording of that provision was non-absolute, Organization's judgments on the policies pursued by the Member States were closely related to the results achieved in relation to these fundamental objectives. They have progressively shifted to new and unavoidable priorities, the defense of balanced budgets, the rigor of monetary policy and the effectiveness of structural reforms" (p.).
Obviously Chavranski did not appreciate some young economists whom he had to do during his presidency and he deplores that fashion plays such a part in economics and that « schools of thought in vogue tend to advocate categorical solutions and to forget the recipes previously recognized ». He goes so far as to question the benefits of free trade, which is a constitutive principle of the Oecd. He dos not partake he « conviction [..] deeply rooted in the majority of minds in the OECD that openness and competition play to the benefit of the most effective and the best, and are beneficial to all actors, whatever their situation and, consequently, for all countries. ».
Moreover he is not fooled that oppponents to public monopolies or state interventionism are less strident whenever giant firms exert a market power, often with the assistance of state. Instead of a fastidious argument again free trade, he stresses the incoherence of the report on Korea which recommended the dismantling of the policies that had been the basis of the country's economic take off and its continuing performances.
After this criticism of liberal principles, it is surprising that Chavranski celebrates the liberalization codes that have been implemented according to these principles but either it would have been too demanding to criticise his own part as chairman of the CMIT -a case of the bridge over river Kwai syndrome or what matters for him is that each government keeps some room to mitigate the possible negative effects. shows. Europe has profited from it, and will continue to do so, provided that it preserves its long-term competitiveness, its capacity for innovation, and its socialmarket economy.[..] . But if globalisation is to be both effective and fair, it must be controlled, steered and managed, according to the collective interests of European citizens ». (Lamy, 1999) did not make it possible to regulate all the excesses of the speculative finance and slowed down the activity of the banks and the insurances, even though these institutions play a central role in the financing of productive investment. He calls for abandoning "easy solutions", adopting international solutions and a "spirit of unity", rather than blaming only a few economic agents for the growing injustice felt by citizens. "In this regard, we have to be discriminating, by opposing finance for its own ends while encouraging finance that promotes investment." (p 40) Considering that the Bretton Woods system had succeeded in introducing regulations to the financial sphere that created "a sorely needed new financial and monetary balance", he implicitly calls for a G20 initiative along the same lines. Placing this issue at the centre of the evolution of human civilization ("We have to rethink humanism for our times"), he criticizes the excesses of financial capitalism which limit the positive effects of globalization. (p 136)
In his foreword of Bertrand Badré's book, "Will finance save the world ?" (2018), he reaffirms the importance of finance but this one "is only a means to serve human ends". However, the deregulated finance resulting from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system is no longer at the service of "governments' greater goals". "The crucial lesson of the 2007 financial crisis is the urgent need to regain control of the global financial system." Money must be reallocated towards environmental innovation, new technologies and development. For this purpose, private institutions must be encouraged to take risks for the general interest.
In "Revolution" (2016), denouncing the growing inequalities arising from the excesses of finance, he calls for a central role for France to change capitalism: "I am convinced that France must take its rightful place in this essential undertakingensuring that human values prevail in globalisation. " (p. 137) According to him, the EU and the G20 must make it possible to find international agreements on several essential topics:
• apply rules to grey financing,
• regulate financial executives' remuneration worldwide,
• combat tax evasion and tax fraud (all existing tax agreements between European Union countries and tax havens must be renegotiated),
• fly the flag of social and environmental responsibility.
"We need to ensure that by 2020 we can lay down the foundations of new rules for globalisation. This is not a battle to "prevent", or simply to "preserve", but a battle against devastating excesses, and for our common future. (…) Our sustained response must be to make globalisation more civilised, and to base our action in the heart of a -Concerning the financial regulation, he is "in favour of the IMF having the mandate to monitor the entire international financial system, entire sections of which are currently unregulated", like cryptocurrencies and shadow banking. Increased regulation would permit to limit financial instability.
In "Revolution" (2016), regarding the euro crisis, he launches the idea of the creation of a "joint Eurozone fund" to deal with major problems: the widening gaps between its economies, the slow recovery, and a lack of public and private In addition, he advocates the establishment of a five-year public-investment plan in France, without waiting for European initiatives that would take too long to set up. "All future investments that can contribute to the plan will need to be dispensed from the debt and deficit objectives included in the EU Stability and Growth Pact." (p. 148)
In Davos (2018), the French president renews his call for a collective action, including international institutions, to overcome the crisis of globalization. In France, it is a question of reorienting the financial system towards capital (finance risks and key innovations) and investment, through tax reforms and measures aiming at reducing labour costs, to bolster territorial attractiveness. The "refoundation of Europe" would concretize "in 10-year strategy (…) to make Europe an actual economic, green, social, scientific and political power". To combat inequalities and the concentration of wealth resulting from the process of economic globalization, the European cooperation on labour and tax law is necessary, as well as a common strategy to deal with the consequences of technical changes, artificial intelligence, for example, or Big Data, particularly in terms of job losses. A new global contract must be "included in the investors' model, banks' model, in the entrepreneurs' model", to prevent most of powers from becoming "free-riders of common goods".
CONCLUSION
The French position on the international monery system has always been marked by a certain defense of orthodoxy, with a central role claimed for gold. In a weak position during the BW negotiations, France is not able to impose its views on the Anglo-Saxon countries. And the role of the IMF as the pivot of the international system will decrease rapidly, at the same time as the dollar becomes a key currency. Jacques Rueff's idea of a need to combat balance of payments imbalances did not ssucceed in bringing about reforms; the considerable deficits of the United States will be maintained over a long period. The influence of Europe is then very weak and the hopes of international monetary cooperation are reduced. 
